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Abstract. Although food quality and food safety issues seem to dominate discussion and research in Europe, price 
inflation and economic recession may pose questions over food abundance over the coming years. For the first 
time since the early seventies, market stability for a number of commodities is seriously questioned. 
The paper tackles the fluctuation of food prices in the last decade and the reasons behind recent record prices in a 
series of commodities, trying to investigate whether food shortages may create new problems, even for relatively 
economically stable nations. Lowering stock levels that induce price volatility, production shortfalls due to adverse 
conditions that are often correlated to climate change, oil prices, changing diet patterns in regions that have 
become more affluent in recent decades, trade policies that often contradict one another, financial speculation in 
food markets all play a distinct role forming today’s reality. The effect of rising food prices is crucially important, 
at the microeconomic level, for poorer households.  
The paper tries to investigate whether food security problems -in the sense that all people, at all times, have 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life- may become increasingly important in Europe in the future, as well as the necessary 
policies to protect those most vulnerable. 
 





Recent  record  prices  in  a  variety  of  food  products  have  drawn  considerable  attention  to  the  less 
privileged people around the world. Individuals facing chronic poverty and food insecurity were among 
the worst hit by recent price fluctuations. It is a fact that there is no single remedy for the problem as it 
does not stem from a single source. Facing an emergent food crisis, different sets of policies have been 
adopted both at national and international level without leaving, however, much space for optimism. 
Market instability in major agricultural commodities coupled with general economic recession may 
provide an explosive mix even in economic regions that are considered affluent, like the EU, at least 
for those at the bottom of the income scale. High unemployment rates, rising prices and increasing 
inequality by definition mean, that more and more people will be left behind, unless necessary policies 
provide an effective social safety net. 
 
 
Agricultural commodities and the 2008 price peaks 
 
The undeniable decline in food prices during 2009 may not modify the importance of sharp increases 
during the two previous  years. The index of  nominal food prices, provided by FAO, has doubled 
between 2002 and 2008, while the real food price index started rising in 2002, following thirty years of 
stable prices and mainly declining trends. Price increases became dramatic during 2006 and 2007, 
leading to record highs for a number of crops. By mid-2008, real food prices were 64% higher than 
their 2002 levels (FAO, 2008a)
1.  At their peaks, during 2008, world prices of wheat and maize were three times higher than those in 
2003,  while  price  of  rice  was  five  times  higher.  Other  food products  were  also  influenced;  Dairy 
products, meat, palm oil and cassava also experienced sharp price hikes during the same 5-year time 
period. The prices of butter and milk tripled and those of beef and poultry doubled. 
Figure 1 illustrates the food price index for the past decade, with the 2008 peak being apparent, while 
Figure 2 shows that not all products had proportionate price fluctuations; the cereals price index has a 
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Figure 1: Food Price Index from 1999 to 2009, 



















Figure 2: Cereals and meat price indices from 1999 to 2009, 
 data from FAO, (2002-04=100) 
 
 
It is not an easy task to address the reasons behind the 2007-08 food price increase. It is certain that not 
a single factor but a variety of reasons have formed today’s reality. Production shortfalls due to adverse 
conditions that are often correlated to climate change do not explain observed price changes but surely 
affect them. The demand side is influenced by changing diet patterns in regions that have become more 
affluent in recent decades, especially in Asia, where consumption of wheat and wheat-based products, temperate-zone  vegetables  and  dairy  products  in  Asia  has  increased  (Pingali  2006)
2.  This  shift  is 
expected to be reinforced in the future. With an income growth of 5.5 percent per year in South Asia, 
annual per capita consumption of rice in the region is projected to decline from its 2000 level by 4 
percent by 2025. At the same time, consumption of milk and vegetables is projected to increase by 70 
percent and consumption of meat, eggs, and fish is projected to increase by 100 percent (Kumar et al. 
2007)
3 
In addition, trade policies that often contradict one another create insecurity; lowering stock levels 
induce price volatility, while oil price increases put further pressure. Further analysing these trends is 
out of the scope of this paper. However, two distinct and rather unique characteristics require further 
consideration. The first one  concerns  financial  speculation in  food markets, the intensity of  which 
constitutes  a  rather  new  phenomenon.  Addressing  this  food-financial  crisis  nexus,  Sodano  (2009)
4 
identifies speculation in commodity futures, following the collapse of the financial derivatives markets, 
as one of the reasons behind recent price surges. The second one that has drawn already considerable 




Financial speculation in food markets 
 
Financial  speculation  involves  the  buying,  holding,  selling,  and  short-selling  of  stocks,  bonds, 
commodities, or any valuable financial instrument to profit from fluctuations in its price as opposed to 
buying  it  for  use  or  for  dividend  or  interest  income  (Robles  et  al.,  2009)
5.  Speculation  is  widely 
understood as the purchase of a good for later resale rather than for use, or the temporary sale of a good 
with the intention of later repurchase in the hope of profiting from an intervening price change.  
It has been suggested that following the downward spiral in financial markets, speculation in food 
products has been increased. If that were true, it could explain drastic peaks in prices that may not be 
addressed  via  the  supply  and  demand  functions.  As  Robles  et  al.  (2009)  point  out  the  flow  of 
speculative capital from financial investors into agricultural commodity markets has been drastic, and 
the number of future traded  contracts is increasing over time. They have used four indicators in total, 
in order to investigate changes in speculative capital on agricultural commodities; volume of futures 
contracts, (which shows the total number of trades in commodity futures contracts in the Chicago 
Board of Trade –CBOT- on a monthly basis), open interest in future contracts (which captures the total 
number of future contracts for a given commodity that have not yet been offset by an opposite position 
or fulfilled by delivery of the commodity), the ratio of volume to open interest in future contracts as 
well as the positions in future contracts by non-commercial traders.  
Among  their  findings  is  that  traded  volumes  of  agricultural  commodity  futures  have  increased 
significantly in recent years. From 2005 to 2006, the average monthly volume of futures for wheat and 
maize grew by more than 60 percent and those for rice by 40 percent. In 2007, traded volumes again 
rose significantly for all four commodities, especially soybeans, whose monthly average was 40 percent 
larger than in 2006. During the first five months of 2008, only the volumes for maize seem to have 
stabilized, whereas the volumes for rice and soybeans were still growing at very high rates—47 percent 
and 40 percent, respectively (Robles et al, 2009). The average monthly open interest in future contracts 
provides a similar story, leaving thus space for scepticism both on the role of short-term speculators, 
who open and close positions in a relatively short period of time and on the entry of medium and long 
term speculators into commodity future markets. In the same context, Plastina (2008)
6 concluded that 
between January 2006 and February 2008, investment fund activity might have pushed cotton prices 14 
percent higher than they would have been otherwise. Sodano (2009) points out that the amount of speculative 
money in commodity futures ballooned from US$5 billion in 2000 to US$175 billion in 2007, in what was 
called in Wall Street the “commodities super-cycle” 
Fiscal profit arising from  speculation represents in essence the reward of the risk accepted by the 
speculator as opposed to a risk-adverse individual. However, excessive, unregulated speculation may 
have negative effects, especially in the case of food markets. Increased price volatility and high peaks 
reduce confidence in global food markets and may pose significant stability problems in the long run.   
While regulating similar transactions is not an easy task and requires considerable resources, the steak 
is very high indeed as those worse affected by price fluctuations are the poor and the effects are often 
irreversible.  
 
 The food-fuel competition 
 
Feedstock represents the principal share of total biofuel production costs. For ethanol and biodiesel, 
feedstock accounts for 50–70% and 70–80% of overall costs, respectively (IEA 2004)
7. Thus, prices of 
agricultural  commodities  used  in  biofuel  production  are  increasingly  connected  to  energy  prices, 
leading to even more fluctuations. Noting that the following paragraphs mainly refer to first generation 
biofuels, which have been the major application so far, it is not difficult to observe that, as increasingly 
more land is devoted to biofuel production, competition between food and fuel becomes transparent. 
Future competitiveness of the biofuel sector will determine the extent to which land, water and capital 
will be diverted away from food production. Figure 3 indicates the rapid expansion in the production of 
biofuels presenting US production of ethanol in millions gallons. As shown in Figure 4, US accounts 
for more than half of the worldwide ethanol production, being one of the two main producers (the other 













1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 2006 2008
 














Figure 4: World ethanol production in 2008 by country, data from RFA 
 Forecasts related to biofuel  production is not an easy task; IFPRI  has developed IMPACT,  which 
stands for International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade and has 
generated two future scenarios, one based on the current rate of biofuel increase, the other assuming a 
drastic raise. Under the planned biofuel expansion scenario, international prices increase by 26% for 
maize and by 18% for oilseeds. Under the more drastic biofuel expansion scenario, maize prices rise by 
72% and oilseeds by 44%. Under both scenarios, the increase in crop prices resulting from expanded 
biofuel production is also accompanied by a net decrease in the availability of and access to food, with 
calorie consumption estimated to decrease across all regions compared to baseline levels (von Braun, 
2007)
8. 
Competition between food and fuel is heavily influenced by protectionist policies regarding biofuels. 
Protectionism is not a new initiative in the sector as it can be traced back in previous decades. The 
general  idea  was  that  biofuels  were  offering  an  alternative  market  for  agricultural  commodities, 
stimulating thus demand and pushing prices upwards. Facing huge budgetary considerations stemming 
by farm subsidies, the suggestion seemed economically viable. The willingness to end dependence on 
traditional oil-producing nations in unstable regions and environmental concerns constitute additional 
drivers that form today’s reality. 
However, the  market environment in the biofuel sector became  highly artificial as the agricultural 
commodities used for biofuel production already enjoyed some degree of protectionism via agricultural 
policies.  Off-farm  subsidies  for  biofuel  production  and  consumption  were  added,  resulting  in  an 
unsustainable  background,  heavily  dependent  on  public  intervention.  Taken  into  consideration  all 
protectionist measures, including import tarrifs, the safety net enabled domestic producers to thrive. 
In general, subsidies for biofuels that use agricultural production resources are extremely anti-poor 
because they implicitly act as a tax on basic food, which represents a large share of poor people’s 
consumption expenditures and becomes even more costly as prices increase (von Braun 2007). The 
International Food Policy Research Institute - IFPRI (Rosegrant et al, 2008)
9 attempted to quantify 
what part of the cereals price rise over the period 2000-07 was caused by biofuels demand. They 
conclude that the increased biofuels demand accounted for 30% of the average price rise of cereals and 
for 39% of that of maize (Alexandratos, 2008)
10. 
Analysing in depth externalities present in the sector, may render a certain degree of protectionism on 
biofuels social benefits. However, the intensity of the subsidies is not compatible with the stated goals. 
The bewildering array of incentives that have been created for biofuels in response to multiple (and 
sometimes contradictory) policy objectives bear all the hallmarks of a popular bandwagon aided and 
abetted by sectional vested interests. Understanding the consequences of these changes before any 






Back in 1973, Richard Nixon imposed a ban on US soybeans exports to ensure local supply, a decision 
that caused immediate outcry from other countries. The US was the major supplier and the measure 
was  perceived  as  threatening  livestock  production.  The  Japanese  were  particularly  unhappy  as 
soybeans are a vital ingredient in their nourishment and 98% of their supplies were coming from the 
US. Although the ban did not last but one week and was subsequently replaced by other protective 
measures, such a reality would be considered distant past some years ago. 
However, protectionist measures seem to become once more up to date, as national governments often 
find refuge in order to help domestic consumers and control food price inflation in the short run. While 
in some countries, such reaction may be addressed as beneficial at the national level and thus desirable 
by local governments, it is not rarely the result of social pressure. 
Demonstrations, protests and riots over the price of food products has been the expectable result of the 
recent crisis that  had serious social repercussions, although those are often  less visible in affluent 
societies. Mexico, Yemen, Pakistan, Mauritania, Senegal, Cameroon, Argentina, India, Burkina Faso 
constitute just a small part of a long list of countries that have also witnessed protests over the last two 
years alone. Suddenly the bread intifadas in Egypt and Morocco in 1977 and 1984 respectively seem 
closer. 
Risking popularity and electoral results, protectionist measures are a drastic option. Jordan, Bangladesh 
and  Morocco,  are  increasing  subsidies  and  reconsidering  their  tariff  regimes,  India  and  Egypt  are 
restricting exports, China centrally controls domestic food prices, while Russia has implemented price 
controls on basic foodstuff. Export tariffs on wheat and other basic food products become once more 
popular; countries import more than they actually need in order to build their stocks.  While  protective  measures  may  provide  a  relief  for  domestic  consumers  in  the  short  run,  integral 
problems  associated  with  market  distortions  do  not  cease  to  exist  as  they  are  economically 
unsustainable and fail to prioritise the greater, long term good. Price controls and export tariffs render 
production less profitable, damaging further the supply side. Subsidised consumer prices delay social 
unrest but simultaneously create an artificial economic environment, stimulating demand and creating 
even more problems in the long run. In February 2008, Kazakhstan’s government announced its plan to 
restrict wheat exports in order to ensure domestic supply. As a result, global wheat prices augmented 
by 25% in a single day. 
 
 
The effect on the poor 
 
It is self evident that at the microeconomic level, the outcome of higher prices depends on whether the 
household is a net buyer or a net seller of food. FAO empirical analysis from developing countries 
indicates that about 75% of rural households and 97 % of urban households are net food buyers (FAO, 
2008a).  The  budget  share  allocated  to  food  and  the  income  elasticity  of  food  increase  as  income 
decreases and this conclusion, stemming both from simple economic logic and actual evidence (Regmi 
et al., 2001
12, Theil et al, 1989
13), stands at the micro as well as the microeconomic level. Individuals 
with limited financial means will allocate more resources proportionately in order to cover basic needs, 
such as eating than rich people that will allot a significant proportion of their income on other needs, 
such as recreation. In addition, poor people will choose low value, inexpensive food products that may 
bear however low nutritional value and they will be much more responsive in price fluctuation.  
Regmi et al. calculated that for every 1% increase in the price of food, food consumption expenditure 
in developing countries decreases by 0.75%, an estimate that may be further aggravated by recent price 
pressures. They also compared consumption spending response to price changes among developed and 
developing countries and their findings show that food consumption spending is much more elastic in 
low-income countries (Regmi et al., 2001). Poor people, once more, bear the burden.  
Ahmed et al. (2007)
14 calculate the number of people living in ultra poverty –less than US 0.5$ a day- 
at 160 millions. Even worse, in certain regions including Sub-Saharan Africa as well as Latin America, 
the absolute number of ultra poor people is still increasing. While this is without doubt reason for great 
concern, persistent inequality may pose new questions for those less privileged, even in the developed 
world. 
 
The other side of economic prosperity 
 
It is not difficult to explain why the bulk of research, analysis and policy measures concerning poor 
people focus on the developing world. Crossing the psychological limit of one billion food insecure 
individuals and the increasing number of ultra-poor (those living on less than $ 0.5 per day) in many 
regions  of  the  planet,  demonstrate  in  tragic  fashion  the  urgency  of  the  problems.  However,  it  is 
simultaneously noticeable that, even in affluent societies, some are left behind. 
Poverty as a notion poses difficulties both in terms of definition and comparison. This is apparent to the 
Dublin  European  Council  definition  that  considers  as  poor  those  persons,  families  and  groups  of 
persons whose resources (material, cultural and social) are so limited as to exclude them from the 
minimum acceptable way of life in the Member State to which they belong. 
The European Council’s definition constitutes interesting reading. Approaching poverty as exclusion 
from the minimum acceptable way of life reveals a relative definition, instead of absolute measures, 
which are mainly used in developing economies. Internationally, thresholds of one or half a US dollar 
per day –in purchasing power parity terms- are used for the identification of poor and ultra poor people 
respectively. One of the UN Millennium Goals portrays this tendency as it is aiming to lower by 50% 
the population earning less than one US dollar per day, in a period of 25 years until 2015. At EU level, 
individuals are considered to be under the risk of poverty when they posses disposable income of below 
60%  of  the  national  median.  This  has  become  the  standard  risk  of  poverty  threshold  in  Europe, 
although Eurostat calculates and publishes rates according to various thresholds. 
It is not very hard to spot that the utilisation of relative measures may camouflage the bigger picture. 
Thus, on one hand, in case of rapid economic growth, disposable income of below 60% of the national 
median may denote acceptable living standard which means a decrease in absolute poverty, although 
the relative measures may show no significant change. On the other hand, during economic recession, 
relative poverty may fail to portray the magnitude of absolute poverty that people live in. Since relative poverty  measures seem to dominate the analysis, income distribution and inequality 
become of primary importance. Figure 5 shows income inequality in selected European countries as 
derived dividing the total income of the richest fifth by the total income of the poorest fifth. The EU 
average is slightly less than 5, with Greece and Portugal presenting the highest inequality rates and 
Sweden the lowest. 
 



















Figure 5: Income inequality in selected European countries 
 (total income of the richest fifth / total income of the poorest fifth),  
data from EU Community Statistics on Income and Living Conditions, 2009 
 
 
As calculated by Lelkes et al. (2009)
15, based on 2006 EU-SILC data, the rate of relative poverty varies 
between 10% and 23% in EU countries, with the proportion of the population with income below the 
poverty threshold lowest in the Czech Republic and the Netherlands and highest in Latvia. They also 
estimate that two-thirds of the total population at risk of poverty in the EU live in the six largest 
countries: Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Poland and Spain. However, this fact conceals regional 
disparities as Germany and Italy have the same absolute number of people at risk of poverty, while the 
latter  is  significantly  smaller  in  terms  of  total  population.  Thus,  Germany  may  have  an  important 
negative contribution to the total amount of people at risk of poverty but still presents risk of poverty 
rates below average. 
Lelkes et al., in the same study try to address low income categories in absolute terms as well. In order 
to do this, they calculate an income of 40% of the EU median as representing an average of just under 
15 Euros per day, expressed in purchasing power terms  than actual Euros. Estimating the income 
equivalent of this level of purchasing power in Poland at 8 Euros per day, they come up with a rather 
arbitrary threshold of around 5 Euros per day (60% of the Polish median), which can be useful for 
illustration purposes. Figure 6 illustrates the actual number of people with equivilised disposable income of under 5 Euros 
per day,  measured in terms  of purchasing power standards for selected European countries. Using 
2005-06  data,  in  Europe  there  were  more  than  14  million  people  in  total  in  this  category,  which 
represent 3% of the total population. Almost half of them live in Poland, followed by Lithuania, Italy 
and Germany. 
Figure 7 shows the percentage of people with equivilised disposable income of under 5 Euros per day 
out of the total population in each country. Almost one out of three Latvians and Lithuanians, one out 






















Figure 6: People with equivilised disposable income of under 5 Euros per day by country,  
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Figure 7: % of people with income under 5 Euros per day  
out of total national population by country, 
adapted from Lelkes et al. (2009), data are from EU-SILC (2006) 
 Policy responses and conclusive remarks 
 
While a variety of driving forces have contributed in the price increases that have seriously affected 
agricultural  markets,  quite  a  few  of  them  are  not  surprising,  as  they  have  emerged  in  the  past. 
Population  growth,  income  growth,  production  shortfalls  and  increasing  demand,  oil  prices  and 
subsequent production costs, trade policies presenting lack of clarity concerning ultimate goals have all 
been  present  and,  at  some  extent  dealt  with,  in  the  past.  Such  surges  were  resolved  through  a 
combination of policy responses and spontaneous market adjustments. If these were the only factors at 
play currently, we could look forward with some confidence to the prospect that the present price 
surges would subside over the short to medium term (Alexandratos, 2008). While panic over price 
increases loses steam, protectionist measures will be relaxed and coupled with supply recovery, food 
prices may return closer to their historical averages in the short run. However, in order to shape polices 
necessary to address future problems, an insight in the integral mechanisms of price formation in the 
long run, is essential.  
An analysed in previous paragraphs, recent food price increases are also due to new, non-traditional 
factors  that  may  prove  to  be  more  than  mere  disturbances  on  the  path  of  world  agriculture 
(Alexandratos, 2008). Biofuel production and the subsequent food-fuel competition may be addressed 
in more than one ways in this context. While protectionist policies that create an artificial environment, 
which  favours  biofuel  expansion  seem  to  dominate  the  discussion  nowadays,  increasing  prices  of 
energy may start to pose new questions in the not so distant future. As long as oil prices continue to 
increase, biofuels will become increasingly competitive and even the removal of their safety net may 
not affect future production, putting thus more pressure in agricultural resources. Unregulated financial 
speculation may aggravate the situation and lead to even more price fluctuations. 
International organisations, including the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
have called for the necessary policy responses in recent declarations (High Level Conference on World 
Food Security, FAO, 2008b
16 and High Level Force on the Global Food Crisis, UN, 2008
17). These 
would  include  emergency  measures  to  combat  food  insecurity  as  well  as  structural  adjustments, 
including stock replenishment and long term agricultural investment to increase productivity. 
While, future predictions regarding the state of world agriculture should be tentative, in the sense that 
they are affected by factors that are surrounded by a certain degree of uncertainty, recent tendencies 
may require policy responses that may alleviate some of the burden for those less privileged. Although 
this fact has long been acknowledged as far as the developing world is concerned, persistent inequality 
coupled with general economic recession may require policy adjustments concerning income lagging 
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